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Sham Marriage and 
Privilege
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
A CASE IN POINT
United States v. Fomichev, 899 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2018), 
discusses the effect that a sham marriage has on marital 
privileges. The court draws a line between the spousal 
immunity (or spousal witness) privilege and the marital 
communications privilege.
THE FACTS
Dimitry Fomichev came to the United States in 2003 
from his Russian birthplace on a student visa. Three 
years later he met and married Svetlana Pogosyan. 
Pogosyan applied for an alien relative visa for Fomichev 
in 2007, and he applied to adjust his immigration status. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security found the 
marriage bona fide, approved the visa, and granted 
Fomichev conditional residence.
With the assistance of counsel, Fomichev and 
Pogosyan petitioned in 2009 to remove the conditions 
on Fomichev’s residence. They indicated that they shared 
an address, certified that their petition and evidence were 
true and correct, and also declared that they married 
pursuant to California law and did not do so for the 
purpose of procuring an immigration benefit. They 
attached copies of their jointly filed tax returns to the 
petition.
The next year, agents of the Internal Revenue Service 
approached Pogosyan to inquire about her marriage. The 
reported opinion does not indicate what caused the IRS 
to focus on her, but regardless of the cause, she agreed 
to meet with IRS agents at a coffee shop. The agents 
asked where she and Fomichev actually lived and about 
the jointly filed tax returns. When she gave conflicting 
answers to these questions, the agents cautioned her that 
lying to federal agents is a felony and that she could owe 
back taxes and be held culpable for filing false returns.
The agents’ warnings appeared to hit home because 
Pogosyan stated she wanted to “come clean” and tell 
the agents the truth. She told them that she married 
Fomichev so that he could secure U.S. citizenship, and 
that in exchange for her marrying him, Fomichev would 
pay her rent. Pogosyan agreed to record telephone calls 
with Fomichev and to wear a concealed recording device 
when she met with Fomichev in person. The recorded 
conversations revealed that Fomichev was concerned 
about his immigration status and at one point said, “do 
not set us up, me and you, in regards to the immigration 
as no one knows, . . . no one can prove anything.”
Pogosyan testified before a federal grand jury in 
2011 about the arrangement to which she had agreed: 
namely, to marry Fomichev so that he could obtain U.S. 
citizenship in exchange for his paying her rent. She also 
testified that she and Fomichev never lived together and 
from the beginning they did not intend for the marriage 
to last more than a couple of years. In 2012 the couple 
divorced.
THE CHARGES, MOTIONS, AND TRIAL
The government charged Fomichev in 2013 with 
three years of filing false income tax returns, two 
counts of falsely certifying that his marriage was not 
for the purpose of procuring an immigration benefit; 
and two counts of making the same false statements 
in immigration documents. Fomichev filed a motion 
to suppress the recorded conversations between him 
and Pogosyan and to bar Pogosyan’s testimony about 
the content of those conversations on two grounds: 
The conversations were protected by the marital 
communications privilege and they were obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The government argued that Fomichev could not 
claim the marital communications privilege because 
the wife had agreed to act as a government informant, 
so there was no valid Fourth Amendment argument, and 
that because Fomichev married Pogosyan for fraudulent 
purposes, the marital communications privilege did not 
apply. The trial judge was called upon to decide two 
questions upon which the Ninth Circuit had not ruled. 
The judge recognized that the Circuit had not decided 
whether one spouse has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when only the other spouse consents to 
electronic monitoring, but relied on Supreme Court cases 
holding that individuals have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the statements they make to government 
informants.
The judge noted on the marital communications 
issue that the parties agreed that, unless an exception 
applied, the marital communications privilege would 
bar the introduction of the recorded conversations and 
Pogosyan’s testimony about their content. The agreement 
reflected the fact that there was a valid marriage, the 
words spoken by the two spouses were communications 
between them, and at least Fomichev intended that 
they be confidential and had no reason to believe that 
Pogosyan had any different intent.
The judge recognized that there is a “sham marriage” 
exception to the spousal immunity privilege, but that 
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there was no Ninth Circuit authority for holding that 
the sham marriage exception applied to the marital 
communications privilege and no cases decided 
elsewhere that supported the government’s argument. 
The judge expressed awareness of Ninth Circuit 
decisions cautioning against what the judge described as 
“engaging in ‘the business of opining on which reasons 
for marriage are legitimate or deserving of marital 
privileges and which ones are not.’” Nevertheless, he 
determined that there was no principled reason not 
to extend the sham marriage exception to the marital 
communications privilege on the facts presented.
The judge found that when Fomichev and Pogosyan 
married in 2006, they initially planned to live together; 
they looked at 25 options before leasing a residence; and 
thereafter they never resided together, slept in the same 
bed, or engaged in sexual relations together. These facts 
caused the judge to conclude that “[o]n the particular 
facts of th[e] case, the policy interests behind the marital 
communications privilege would not be advanced and 
would surely be outweighed by the competing societal 
interest for truth and the administration of justice.”
The judge denied Fomichev’s motion, the government 
dropped one tax count prior to trial, a jury convicted 
Fomichev on the four false-statement counts, and the 
judge granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
remaining tax counts. The judge sentenced Fomichev to 
only three years of probation.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge was wrong 
to hold that a sham marriage warranted an exception 
from the marital communications privilege after 
distinguishing between the spousal immunity and the 
marital communications privileges. The court cited cases 
holding that a “sham marriage” bars invocation of the 
spousal immunity privilege:
The spousal testimonial privilege * * * prohibits 
one spouse from testifying against the other in 
criminal cases during the course of their marriage, 
and “the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to 
refuse to testify adversely.” Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 100 S. Ct. 906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 
186 (1980). The spousal testimonial privilege ends 
when a marriage ends. * * * The sham marriage 
exception to the spousal testimonial privilege 
is a narrow exception that has typically arisen 
when there has been a close temporal proximity 
between the date of a marriage and the date when 
a witness-spouse has been expected to testify. See 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (84-5), 777 F.2d 
508, 509 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (considering 
applicability of sham marriage exception because 
couple married on the eve of trial); United States 
v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975)
(holding the spousal testimonial privilege could 
not be invoked by a witness-spouse because she 
and the defendant “were married only three days 
before trial”). We have affirmed a district court’s 
ruling that the spousal testimonial privilege was 
not available to a witness-spouse because “the 
purpose of the marriage was for . . . invoking the 
[spousal testimonial] privilege.” United States v. 
Saniti, 604 F.2d 603, 604 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(per curiam).
The Ninth Circuit cited to Lutwak v. United States, 
344 U.S. 604, 614 (1953), in which the Supreme Court 
addressed the concept of a “sham marriage” in the 
immigration context:
When the good faith of the marital relation is 
pertinent and it is made to appear to the trial court, 
as it was here, that the relationship was entered 
into with no intention of the parties to live together 
as husband and wife but only for the purpose 
of using the marriage ceremony in a scheme to 
defraud, the ostensible spouses are competent to 
testify against each other.
The Ninth Circuit spent almost no time identifying the 
rationale for the sham marriage exception as applied to 
the spousal immunity privilege, but the rationale appears 
to be twofold. First, the notion that a person is marrying 
a potential witness to make that witness unavailable in a 
criminal case suggests a kind of obstruction of justice. 
This rationale had even greater strength before the 
Supreme Court’s Trammel decision (supra) because until 
that decision the spousal immunity privilege could be 
claimed by either spouse. This meant that if a defendant 
was about to be charged or go to trial and the defendant 
could coerce, bribe, or otherwise compel a witness 
to marry, the defendant could claim the privilege and 
essentially close the witness’s mouth. This possibility 
led one court, United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299 (7th 
Cir. 1983), to hold that the difficult proof problems in 
determining a sham marriage warrant an exception to 
the spousal immunity privilege for all premarital acts.
Second, marriage should not be a step in carrying out 
a conspiracy to defraud in contexts like immigration. 
Immigration law requires a couple in the position of 
Fomichev and Pogosyan to certify that they did not marry 
for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. A 
couple that knows that it married to obtain an immigration 
benefit and intends to lie to government agencies to obtain 
that benefit conspire to violate federal law.
The Ninth Circuit placed the burden on the government 
to persuade it that the sham marriage exception should 
be extended to the marital communications privilege. 
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This meant that the government had to demonstrate 
that the rationale for the exception as developed in 
the spousal immunity context also applied to marital 
communications. The court concluded that the 
government had not met its burden. The substance of 
the court’s reasoning is contained in a footnote:
We recognize that people marry for many different 
religious, cultural, and social reasons. Marriages 
that are entered into for practical reasons may 
ripen into loving relationships, and happily 
unmarried couples may decide to marry for estate 
planning purposes, to secure health benefits, or to 
increase their chances of successfully adopting 
children, Piper v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 
93-35575, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22022, 1994
WL 424292 at *2–3 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1994). See
United States v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d 1143,
1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Just as marriages for money,
hardly a novelty, or marriages among princes and
princesses for reasons of state may be genuine
and not sham marriages, so may marriages for
green cards be genuine.”). Under our case law,
determining the applicability of the sham marriage
exception requires a limited inquiry into whether
parties married for the purpose of invoking the
testimonial privilege. This is consistent with our
previous admonitions that courts should be wary
of passing judgment on parties’ personal reasons
for marrying. See [United States v.] Roberson, 859
F.2d [1376], at 1380 [(9th Cir. 1988)] (observing
that adjudicating the applicability of marital
privileges can “involve district judges in difficult
and sometimes inappropriate inquiries”).
Thus, the reason why the sham marriage exception 
does not apply to marital communications is that as 
long as a couple is legally married, there is nothing 
“sham” about their relationship in the eyes of the law. 
As the footnote quoted above indicates, people marry 
and stay married for many reasons. The sham marriage 
exception as applied to the spousal immunity privilege 
prevents obstruction of justice and fraud. When there is 
no obstruction or fraud, a marriage that is completely 
legal is a relationship that the marital communications 
privilege is intended to foster. As the Ninth Circuit said 
in Fomichev, “[l]ike the physician-patient and clergy-
penitent privileges, the marital communications privilege 
recognizes that society has an enormously strong interest 
in preserving a particular social institution—here, the 
institution of marriage.”
THE REMAND
Although the Circuit rejected the government’s effort 
to extend the sham marriage exception beyond spousal 
testimony to the marital communications privilege, it 
declined to reverse Fomichev’s conviction. It noted 
that “it appears that the parties mistakenly focused on 
litigating exceptions to the marital communications 
privilege, without recognizing that it only extends to 
communications made during the marriage or until 
a marriage becomes irreconcilable”; found that “[i]
rreconcilability was not the focus of the government’s 
argument in the district court, but the government 
did advance this argument in the district court and it 
continues to argue this point on appeal”; and decided that 
“because the district court did not make a finding about 
whether the subject marriage was irreconcilable when 
the IRS recorded Fomichev’s statements, we remand for 
the district court to rule on irreconcilability.”
LESSONS
1. Federal law on privilege continues to recognize
two distinct marital privileges: spousal immunity
and marital communications.
2. Each of these privileges provides different pro-
tections. The testifying spousal holds the spousal
immunity privilege and may only exercise it in
criminal cases, and it ends when the marriage ends.
Both spouses hold the marital communications
privilege, and it continues after the marriage ends
to protect confidential communications made dur-
ing the marriage.
3. Different exceptions may apply to the two priv-
ileges, as illustrated by Fomichev, as the court
holds that the sham marriage exception, estab-
lished as an exception to spousal immunity, is not
extended to the marital communications privilege.
4. On remand, the district court will have to resolve
a knotty issue: What does it mean for a mar-
riage to become irreconcilable? Fomichev and
Pogosyan stayed married, even while living sep-
arately, for six years. Because the Ninth Circuit
indicated that “courts should be wary of passing
judgment on parties’ personal reasons for mar-
rying,” it would seem that courts also should be
wary of passing judgments on why married cou-
ples stay married. During the period that Pogosyan
was secretly engaging in recorded conversations
with Fomichev, she obviously was willing to assist
the government and thereby hurt Fomichev. From
her perspective she must have decided that the
marriage was irreconcilable once she became
a government cooperator. But Fomichev might
have had no idea that Pogosyan was cooperat-
ing and apparently willing to damage the man
who was still her legal spouse. Does irreconcil-
ability require acknowledgment by both spouses?
The answer would appear to be a question of law,
which means that there may be another legal ques-
tion for the Ninth Circuit on a second appeal. n
